Information precision and asymptotic efficiency of industrial markets
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Publication:932770
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2007.04.010zbMath1142.91648OpenAlexW3122703731MaRDI QIDQ932770
Publication date: 11 July 2008
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/28406
Cites Work
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