Optimal debt contracts under costly enforcement

DOI10.1007/s00199-009-0461-1zbMath1231.91284OpenAlexW3123061497MaRDI QIDQ976769

Hans K. Hvide, Tore E. Leite

Publication date: 16 June 2010

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-009-0461-1

zbMATH Keywords

debt contractcostly state verificationpriority violationstrategic defaults

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Credit risk (91G40) Actuarial science and mathematical finance (91G99)

Related Items

Enforcement frictions and optimal lending contracts ⋮ The loan contract with costly state verification and subjective beliefs ⋮ Sorting the good guys from bad: on the optimal audit structure with ex-ante information acquisition ⋮ The productivity cost of sovereign default: evidence from the European debt crisis ⋮ Investor protection and optimal contracts under risk aversion and costly state verification

Uses Software

• Prosper

Cites Work

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