Optimal use of correlated information in mechanism design when full surplus extraction may be impossible

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007zbMath1186.91045OpenAlexW2135252017MaRDI QIDQ996382

Subir Bose, Jin-Hua Zhao

Publication date: 14 September 2007

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2006.05.007

zbMATH Keywords

correlated signalsrent extraction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (4)

A note on optimal contracting with public \textit{ex post} information under limited liability ⋮ Optimal assignment mechanisms with imperfect verification ⋮ Auction design with endogenously correlated buyer types ⋮ Optimal contracts with contingent allocation

Cites Work

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• Optimal contracts with public ex post information
• Continuity in auction design
• The robustness of the independent private value model in Bayesian mechanism design
• Correlated information, mechanism design and informational rents
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Full Extraction of the Surplus in Bayesian and Dominant Strategy Auctions
• Correlated Information and Mecanism Design

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