Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2008.05.004zbMath1155.91307DBLPjournals/mss/AnderssonS08OpenAlexW2153342664WikidataQ59567293 ScholiaQ59567293MaRDI QIDQ1005746

Tommy Andersson, Lars-Gunnar Svensson

Publication date: 10 March 2009

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2008.05.004

zbMATH Keywords

fairnessindivisiblescoalitionally strategy-proofness

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Communication networks in operations research (90B18) Cooperative games (91A12) Public goods (91B18)

Related Items (11)

Solving house allocation problems with risk-averse agents ⋮ On the manipulability of competitive equilibrium rules in many-to-many buyer-seller markets ⋮ Properties of the DGS-auction algorithm ⋮ Weakly fair allocations and strategy-proofness ⋮ Sets in excess demand in simple ascending auctions with unit-demand bidders ⋮ Least manipulable envy-free rules in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Asymmetrically fair rules for an indivisible good problem with a budget constraint ⋮ Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result ⋮ An assignment model with local constraints: competitive equilibrium and ascending auction ⋮ Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness ⋮ Gale’s Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• A general strategy proof fair allocation mechanism
• Large Indivisibles: An Analysis with Respect to Price Equilibrium and Fairness
• Competitive equilibria with indivisible goods
• Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
• The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
• No-Envy and Consistency in Economies with Indivisible Goods
• On Representatives of Subsets

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