Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
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Publication:1046299
DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2009.08.016zbMath1179.91128MaRDI QIDQ1046299
Publication date: 21 December 2009
Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.08.016
91B44: Economics of information
Cites Work
- Ignorance in agency problems
- Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
- All-or-nothing information control
- Stopping agents from ``cheating
- Strategic information gathering before a contract is offered
- Contracts and productive information gathering
- A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
- Implementation in principal-agent models of adverse selection
- The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
- Optimal Incentive Schemes with Many Agents
- Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
- Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms