Two-sided matching with incomplete information about others' preferences

DOI10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3zbMath0755.90107MaRDI QIDQ1191821

Alvin E. Roth

Publication date: 27 September 1992

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(89)90018-3

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete information; two-sided matching processes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A40: Other game-theoretic models

91B68: Matching models

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