Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1202563
DOI10.1007/BF01258276zbMATH Open0769.90005OpenAlexW2082041392MaRDI QIDQ1202563FDOQ1202563
Hans Peters, Ton Storcken, Hans van der Stel
Publication date: 14 February 1993
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01258276
Cites Work
- Algebraic aggregation theory
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategy-Proof Allocation Mechanisms at Differentiable Points
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Properties of consistent voting systems
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
- Nonmanipulability in two dimensions
- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- A class of solutions for multiperson multicriteria decision making
- Nonmanipulable decision mechanisms for economic environments
Cited In (19)
- Monotonic norms and orthogonal issues in multidimensional voting
- Social Choice Theory
- Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
- The impossibility of a paretian rational: a Bayesian perspective
- Strategy-proof probabilistic mechanisms in economies with pure public goods.
- Strategy-proof aggregation rules and single peakedness in bounded distributive lattices
- Locating a public good on a sphere
- On strategy-proofness and symmetric single-peakedness
- Voting on multiple issues: What to put on the ballot?
- Generalized median solutions, strategy-proofness and strictly convex norms
- Optimality of the coordinate-wise median mechanism for strategyproof facility location in two dimensions
- Truthful aggregation of budget proposals
- Efficient and strategy-proof voting rules: A characterization
- Strategy-proofness, Pareto optimality and strictly convex norms
- Random mechanism design on multidimensional domains
- Range convexity, continuity, and strategy-proofness of voting schemes
- Weakly unimodal domains, anti-exchange properties, and coalitional strategy-proofness of aggregation rules
- Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc
- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
This page was built for publication: Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1202563)
