Iterated expectations and common priors

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0616zbMath0910.90285OpenAlexW2054285221MaRDI QIDQ1268659

Dov Samet

Publication date: 8 December 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/e87d90f0c684aae101f8a773a39dcf6c092cfe22

zbMATH Keywords

necessary and sufficient conditionMarkov matricesexistence of a common prior

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (21)

Finite order implications of common priors in infinite models ⋮ Mechanisms for information elicitation ⋮ Self-consistency, consistency and cycles in non-partitional knowledge models ⋮ Monologues, dialogues, and common priors ⋮ Value‐based distance between information structures ⋮ Self-evident events and the value of linking ⋮ Price distortions under coarse reasoning with frequent trade ⋮ Belief consistency and trade consistency ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The cycles approach ⋮ Monotonic models and cycles ⋮ Conditional belief types ⋮ The positive foundation of the common prior assumption ⋮ Quantified beliefs and believed quantities ⋮ Iterated expectations, compact spaces, and common priors ⋮ The veil of public ignorance ⋮ On the consistency among prior, posteriors, and information sets ⋮ From posteriors to priors via cycles ⋮ Common priors and separation of convex sets ⋮ How common are common priors? ⋮ Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors

Cites Work

• Approximating common knowledge with common beliefs
• Agreeing to disagree
• Trade with Heterogeneous Prior Beliefs and Asymmetric Information
• Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players Part II. Bayesian Equilibrium Points

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