On the relationship of the Condorcet winner and positional voting rules
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Publication:1277472
DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00005-XzbMath0915.90007OpenAlexW2083278702MaRDI QIDQ1277472
Maria Tataru, Vincent R. Merlin
Publication date: 27 April 1999
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00005-x
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Cites Work
- On the volume of hyperbolic polyhedra
- Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
- The likelihood of dubious election outcomes
- Geometry of voting
- The Borda method is most likely to respect the Condorcet principle
- Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
- On probability models in voting theory
