Optimal retention in agency problems

DOI10.1006/jeth.1998.2422zbMath0915.90051MaRDI QIDQ1276112

Jeffrey S. Banks, Rangarajan K. Sundaram

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2422

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazard; adverse selection; series of short-lived agents; single long-lived principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A65: Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games)

91B62: Economic growth models

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