Optimal retention in agency problems

DOI10.1006/JETH.1998.2422zbMath0915.90051OpenAlexW2068316288MaRDI QIDQ1276112

Jeffrey S. Banks, Rangarajan K. Sundaram

Publication date: 16 June 1999

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1998.2422

zbMATH Keywords

moral hazardadverse selectionseries of short-lived agentssingle long-lived principal

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Hierarchical games (including Stackelberg games) (91A65) Economic growth models (91B62)

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Cites Work

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• Rational cooperation in the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma
• Commitment and Fairness in a Dynamic Regulatory Relationship
• Repeated Principal-Agent Games with Discounting
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• Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• One-Sector Nonclassical Optimal Growth: Optimality Conditions and Comparative Dynamics
• Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
• Monotone Comparative Statics
• Adverse Selection and Renegotiation in Procurement
• Parametric continuity in dynamic programming problems

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