Consensus rules for committee elections

DOI10.1016/S0165-4896(97)00033-4zbMath0936.91015OpenAlexW2095257534MaRDI QIDQ1296465

William H. E. Day, Hans-Hermann Bock, Fred R. McMorris

Publication date: 25 May 2000

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(97)00033-4

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyplurality ruleconsensus rulescollective choicevoting schemecommittee election

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (6)

Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Strategy-proof consensus rules for committee elections. ⋮ Strategic voting in multi-winner elections with approval balloting: a theory for large electorates ⋮ A characterization of a family of consensus rules for committee elections ⋮ Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will? ⋮ Attainable results in committee elections.

Cites Work

• Consistency of decision processes
• Pattern recognition in several sequences: Consensus and alignment
• Characterizations of the plurality function
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• A characterization result for the plurality rule
• Geometry of voting
• On the consistency of the plurality rule consensus function for molecular sequences
• The asymptotic plurality rule for molecular sequences
• Consensus functions and patterns in molecular sequences
• Stability in Voting
• Voting by Committees
• A Formal Theory of Consensus
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Social Choice Scoring Functions
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• Circle Pictograms for Vote Vectors

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