Pure strategy Nash equilibrium in a group formation game with positive externalities

DOI10.1006/GAME.1997.0542zbMath0891.90182OpenAlexW1997461621MaRDI QIDQ1378022

Hideo Konishi, Michel Le Breton, Shlomo Weber

Publication date: 3 August 1998

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0542

zbMATH Keywords

pure strategy Nash equilibriumno spillover noncooperative gamespositive externality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (20)

Equivalence of strong and coalition-proof Nash equilibria in games without spillovers ⋮ Strong equilibria in games with the lexicographical improvement property ⋮ Congestion games revisited ⋮ Correlated equilibria, incomplete information and coalitional deviations ⋮ Coordination Games on Weighted Directed Graphs ⋮ Coordination games on graphs ⋮ Equilibria in bottleneck games ⋮ Large-scale dynamics of mean-field games driven by local Nash equilibria ⋮ Power at general equilibrium ⋮ Externality effects in the formation of societies ⋮ Dynamic club formation with coordination ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ Stable coalition structures with open membership and asymmetric firms ⋮ Efficiency and consistency for locating multiple public facilities ⋮ On the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in group formation games ⋮ Stability of jurisdiction structures under the equal share and median rules ⋮ Coalition formation with local public goods and group-size effect ⋮ Optimal Transport and Cournot-Nash Equilibria ⋮ Weighted congestion games with separable preferences ⋮ Sorting out single-crossing preferences on networks

Cites Work

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• Proportional taxation: Nonexistence of stable structures in an economy with a public good
• Strong Tiebout equilibrium under restricted preferences domain
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Second best taxation as a game
• Equilibrium in a finite local public goods economy
• Intermediate preferences and stable coalition structures
• Quasi-linear utility in a discrete choice model
• Potential games
• Congestion games with player-specific payoff functions
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria

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