Learning to play limited forecast equilibria
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Publication:1384018
DOI10.1006/game.1997.0589zbMath0895.90190MaRDI QIDQ1384018
Publication date: 13 April 1998
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/4feb2cbc8b1fdf898ec4a62abc9a5458017950af
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Modelling equilibrium play as governed by analogy and limited foresight, Adaptation and complexity in repeated games, Learning by trial and error, Learning, hypothesis testing, and Nash equilibrium., Analogy-based expectation equilibrium, Self-confirming equilibrium and the Lucas critique
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