A global Newton method to compute Nash equilibria.

91A10: Noncooperative games

65H20: Global methods, including homotopy approaches to the numerical solution of nonlinear equations

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Action-graph games, A decomposition algorithm for \(N\)-player games, Homotopy methods to compute equilibria in game theory, Equilibrium tracing in strategic-form games, Simple search methods for finding a Nash equilibrium, Computing Nash equilibria by iterated polymatrix approximation, Global Newton method for stochastic games, Symmetries and the complexity of pure Nash equilibrium, A dynamic homotopy interpretation of the logistic quantal response equilibrium correspondence, Robust game theory

Cites Work

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