When are Nash equilibria self-enforcing? An experimental analysis

DOI10.1007/s001820000054zbMath1060.91501OpenAlexW2063048600MaRDI QIDQ1414370

Martin Sefton, Stephen Kay, Kenneth D. Clark

Publication date: 20 November 2003

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820000054

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

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