Characterizing common priors in the form of posteriors

DOI10.1006/jeth.1999.2592zbMath0983.91033MaRDI QIDQ1572940

Yossi Feinberg

Publication date: 23 April 2002

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1999.2592

zbMATH Keywords

consistency condition; common prior assumption

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B06: Decision theory

91B44: Economics of information

62C05: General considerations in statistical decision theory

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