Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games
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Publication:1581903
DOI10.1006/game.1999.0756zbMath1032.91008OpenAlexW2011031029MaRDI QIDQ1581903
Joergen W. Weibull, Abhijit V. Banerjee
Publication date: 10 June 2001
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/dcae2027e1db74b094923b6293b31e6ccc1ce46c
Related Items (8)
Evolution of risk-taking behaviour and status preferences in anti-coordination games ⋮ Universalization and altruism ⋮ Communication, renegotiation and coordination with private values ⋮ Effects of size, composition, and evolutionary pressure in heterogeneous Cournot oligopolies with best response decisional mechanisms ⋮ Heterogeneity and the (de)stabilizing role of rationality ⋮ Cooperation, secret handshakes, and imitation in the prisoners' dilemma ⋮ Noisy communication and the evolution of cooperation ⋮ Evolutionary stability of discrimination under observability
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