Conditionally independent private information in OCS wildcat auctions

DOI10.1016/S0304-4076(99)00081-0zbMath0955.62120OpenAlexW2114268878MaRDI QIDQ1584771

Tong Li, Isabelle Perrigne, Quang H. Vuong

Publication date: 17 January 2001

Published in: Journal of Econometrics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0304-4076(99)00081-0

zbMATH Keywords

measurement error modelcommon value modelconditionally independent private informationOCS wildcat auctions

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of statistics to economics (62P20) Density estimation (62G07) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

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