A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations

DOI10.1007/S001990100174zbMath1011.91006OpenAlexW2050261122MaRDI QIDQ1597938

Yan Chen

Publication date: 4 June 2002

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2027.42/41916

zbMATH Keywords

Nash equilibriumsupermodular gamesLindahl allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

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