Designing efficient and incentive compatible mechanisms is almost impossible in quasi-linear environments

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2018.09.018zbMath1402.91116OpenAlexW2894725500MaRDI QIDQ1627001

Yong Li, Hefei Wang, Jianxin Yi

Publication date: 22 November 2018

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a62c6a7/UQa62c6a7_OA.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

efficiencymechanism designincentive compatibilityimpossibilityfinancial constraints

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Social choice (91B14)

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