Critical discount factor values in discounted supergames

DOI10.3390/G9030047zbMath1418.91074OpenAlexW2868998058WikidataQ129529404 ScholiaQ129529404MaRDI QIDQ1630459

Markus Kärki, Kimmo Berg

Publication date: 10 December 2018

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g9030047

zbMATH Keywords

correlated equilibriumrepeated gamediscount factorfolk theorem\(2\times 2\) gamespayoff set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Set-valued games and mixed-strategy equilibria in discounted supergames

Cites Work

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• Optimal cartel equilibria with imperfect monitoring
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• On Repeated Games with Complete Information
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• The Folk Theorem for Repeated Games: A Neu Condition
• The Folk Theorem with Imperfect Public Information
• An algorithm for two-player repeated games with perfect monitoring
• The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
• FRACTAL GEOMETRY OF EQUILIBRIUM PAYOFFS IN DISCOUNTED SUPERGAMES
• A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames
• Computing Supergame Equilibria

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