Sequential versus static screening: an equivalence result
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Publication:1682735
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2017.10.015zbMath1414.91152OpenAlexW2189356662MaRDI QIDQ1682735
Roland Strausz, Daniel Krähmer
Publication date: 5 December 2017
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bvb:19-epub-58037-2
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