Voluntary disclosure in bilateral transactions

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2018.02.005zbMath1422.91454OpenAlexW3121657128MaRDI QIDQ1753714

Xingtan Zhang, Christian C. Opp, Vincent Glode

Publication date: 29 May 2018

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2018.02.005

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationmarket powerpersuasiondisclosureinformation design

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Economics of information (91B44)

Related Items (1)

Disclosure, welfare and adverse selection

Cites Work

• Efficient mechanisms for bilateral trading
• Verifiable disclosure
• Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
• Government interventions in a dynamic market with adverse selection
• Should we regulate financial information?
• Competitive signalling
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Stress tests and information disclosure
• Perfect sequential equilibrium
• The Optimal Amount of Discretion to Allow in Disclosure
• Strategic Information Revelation
• Information Sharing in Oligopoly
• Informational Equilibrium
• Intertemporal Price Discrimination
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Optimal Auction Design
• Supplying Information to Facilitate Price Discrimination
• Runs versus Lemons: Information Disclosure and Fiscal Capacity
• A Liquidity-based Model of Security Design
• Disclosures and Asset Returns
• Optimal Information Disclosure in Auctions and the Handicap Auction

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