The existence of equilibrium in incomplete markets and the objective function of the firm

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(95)00720-2zbMath0858.90019OpenAlexW2046528447WikidataQ57928093 ScholiaQ57928093MaRDI QIDQ1815225

David Kelsey, Frank Milne

Publication date: 7 November 1996

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(95)00720-2

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete marketsexternalitiesshareholder votingobjective function of the firm

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items

Production externalities: internalization by voting ⋮ Production in incomplete markets: expectations matter for political stability ⋮ Externalities, monopoly and the objective function of the firm ⋮ A geometric study of shareholders' voting in incomplete markets: Multivariate median and mean shareholder theorems ⋮ A bargaining theory of the firm ⋮ Investment and financing in incomplete markets ⋮ On the gains from international financial integration ⋮ Corporate self-regulation of imperfect competition ⋮ Shareholders' choice

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