Two-person bargaining with verifiable information
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Publication:1886755
DOI10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.07.001zbMath1099.91017OpenAlexW2108787378MaRDI QIDQ1886755
Enrico Minelli, Geoffroy de Clippel
Publication date: 19 November 2004
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2003.07.001
Cooperative games (91A12) 2-person games (91A05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
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