A market to implement the core

DOI10.1006/jeth.1995.1075zbMath0841.90135OpenAlexW2000088562MaRDI QIDQ1906733

Roberto Serrano

Publication date: 29 July 1996

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeth.1995.1075

zbMATH Keywords

subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) General equilibrium theory (91B50)

Related Items (21)

Spoilers, blocking coalitions, and the core ⋮ Overlapping coalitions, bargaining and networks ⋮ Incompatibility between stability and consistency ⋮ Reinterpreting the kernel ⋮ A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation ⋮ Non-cooperative bargaining and the incomplete informational core ⋮ Transparency, complementarity and holdout ⋮ Implementation in the many-to-many matching market. ⋮ Stable coalition governments: the case of three political parties ⋮ Negotiation, preferences over agreements, and the core ⋮ Cooperative Games ⋮ A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games ⋮ The type-agent core for exchange economies with asymmetric information ⋮ A note on the individualistic foundations of the core in economies with asymmetric information ⋮ Hiring procedures to implement stable allocations ⋮ Implementation of bargaining sets via simple mechanisms ⋮ Every member of the core is as respectful as any other ⋮ An implementation-theoretic approach to non-cooperative foundations ⋮ Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation ⋮ A simple selling and buying procedure ⋮ Bargaining and bargaining sets.

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