Bayes-Nash equilibria of the generalized second-price auction

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.001zbMath1296.91127OpenAlexW2029498092MaRDI QIDQ2016248

Kane Sweeney, Renato Gomes

Publication date: 19 June 2014

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2012.09.001

zbMATH Keywords

sponsored searchBayes-Nash equilibriumposition auctionsclick-through ratesgeneralized second-price auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (12)

Generalized second price auctions over a network ⋮ Bayes-Nash equilibrium of the generalized first-price auction ⋮ Asymmetric all‐pay auctions with spillovers ⋮ Matching through position auctions ⋮ Hybrid mechanisms for Vickrey-Clarke-Groves and generalized second-price bids ⋮ Statistical modeling of Vickrey auctions and applications to automated bidding strategies ⋮ An experimental study of sponsored-search auctions ⋮ Computational analysis of perfect-information position auctions ⋮ Bounding the inefficiency of outcomes in generalized second price auctions ⋮ Position auctions with multi-unit demands ⋮ Expressiveness and Robustness of First-Price Position Auctions ⋮ Evolutionary stability in the generalized second-price auction

Cites Work

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• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• All equilibria of the multi-unit Vickrey auction
• Position Auctions with Consumer Search
• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information
• Optimal Efficiency Guarantees for Network Design Mechanisms
• Isotone Equilibrium in Games of Incomplete Information
• Coarse Matching

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