Privacy, patience, and protection

DOI10.1007/s13235-021-00386-zzbMath1481.91036OpenAlexW3157978979MaRDI QIDQ2068909

Rann Smorodinsky, Ronen Gradwohl

Publication date: 20 January 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00386-z

zbMATH Keywords

signaling gamesprivacyprivacy protectionperception games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (1)

Myopic perception in repeated games

Cites Work

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