Power illusion in coalitional bargaining: an experimental analysis

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.07.010zbMath1425.91201OpenAlexW2966387562MaRDI QIDQ2273964

Fabian Paetzel, Stefan Traub, Nicola Friederike Maaser

Publication date: 19 September 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/168155

zbMATH Keywords

experimentscoalition formationlegislative bargainingweighted votingalternating offers

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (1)

Gender and nominal power in multilateral bargaining

Uses Software

• Z-Tree
• hroot

Cites Work

• Gambler's fallacy and imperfect best response in legislative bargaining
• Veto power in committees: An experimental study
• Gaining power through enlargement: strategic foundations and experimental evidence
• Luxembourg in the early days of the EEC: null player or not?
• Uniqueness of stationary equilibrium payoffs in coalitional bargaining
• On minimum integer representations of weighted games
• Gamson's Law versus non-cooperative bargaining theory
• Noncooperative foundations of the nucleolus in majority games
• Learning in a multilateral bargaining experiment
• Behavioral Identification in Coalitional Bargaining: An Experimental Analysis of Demand Bargaining and Alternating Offers
• Experiments in Majoritarian Bargaining

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