On the equilibrium of voting games with abstention and several levels of approval
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Publication:2268890
DOI10.1007/s00355-009-0403-7zbMath1201.91054OpenAlexW2034205164MaRDI QIDQ2268890
Lawrence Diffo Lambo, Joël Moulen, Roland Pongou, Bertrand Tchantcho
Publication date: 15 March 2010
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0403-7
Related Items (7)
Stable sets and cores for multi-criteria simple games and for their extensions ⋮ Bounds for the Nakamura number ⋮ Political influence in multi-choice institutions: cyclicity, anonymity, and transitivity ⋮ Supermajority politics: equilibrium range, policy diversity, utilitarian welfare, and political compromise ⋮ Probabilistic power indices for voting rules with abstention ⋮ A policy-based rationalization of collective rules: dimensionality, specialized houses, and decentralized authority ⋮ SOME OPEN PROBLEMS IN SIMPLE GAMES
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