Domain expansion of the pivotal mechanism

DOI10.1007/S00355-009-0411-7zbMath1201.91061OpenAlexW2140813564MaRDI QIDQ2268895

Hiroki Saitoh, Kazuhiko Hashimoto

Publication date: 15 March 2010

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-009-0411-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Welfare economics (91B15)

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Cites Work

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• Incentives in Teams
• Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods
• A Note on the Characterization of Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences
• Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains

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