Prior independent mechanisms via prophet inequalities with limited information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.006zbMath1429.91169OpenAlexW2809899475MaRDI QIDQ2278945

Robert D. Kleinberg, S. Matthew Weinberg, Pablo D. Azar

Publication date: 12 December 2019

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2018.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

game theorybargaining theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Other game-theoretic models (91A40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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