Scoring rules and social choice properties: some characterizations

DOI10.1007/s11238-014-9429-0zbMath1377.91085OpenAlexW1973450406WikidataQ58341321 ScholiaQ58341321MaRDI QIDQ2353589

Bonifacio Llamazares, Teresa Peña

Publication date: 15 July 2015

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://uvadoc.uva.es/handle/10324/21499

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto-optimalityscoring rulesabsolute loser paradoxreversal symmetry

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Weighted scoring elections: is Borda best? ⋮ On the reversal bias of the minimax social choice correspondence ⋮ Violations of Reversal Symmetry Under Simple and Runoff Scoring Rules ⋮ The scorix: a popular representation of votes revisited ⋮ Robust winner determination in positional scoring rules with uncertain weights

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