Minimal consistent enlargements of the immediate acceptance rule and the top trading cycles rule in school choice
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Publication:2362200
DOI10.1007/s00355-016-0954-3zbMath1392.91129OpenAlexW138279150MaRDI QIDQ2362200
Publication date: 6 July 2017
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/dcede2014-45.pdf
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Cites Work
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