Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation
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Publication:2398186
DOI10.1007/s00182-016-0538-6zbMath1398.91038OpenAlexW2411746227MaRDI QIDQ2398186
Publication date: 15 August 2017
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-016-0538-6
Related Items
Self-enforcing coalitions with power accumulation, Robust equilibria in tournaments, An experimental study of self-enforcing coalitions
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