Revenue and efficiency in multi-unit uniform-price auctions
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Publication:2437816
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.007zbMath1282.91122OpenAlexW3125846487MaRDI QIDQ2437816
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.05.007
market efficiencyreservation pricediscriminatory auctionmultiple-object auctionmulti-unit auctionuniform-price auctionoptimal selling mechanism
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