Minimum payments and induced effort in moral hazard problems
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Publication:2437832
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.004zbMath1282.91175OpenAlexW2119220666MaRDI QIDQ2437832
Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publication date: 13 March 2014
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2013.08.004
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Related Items (3)
On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach ⋮ The risk-sharing problem under limited liability constraints in a single-period model ⋮ Optimal contract under double moral hazard and limited liability
Cites Work
- Limited liability and incentive contracting with ex-ante action choices
- Moral hazard with bounded payments
- Limited liability contracts between principal and agent
- Distributions for the first-order approach to principal-agent problems
- Wealth effects in the principal agent model
- On the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach
- The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- Justifying the First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
- The Theory of Moral Hazard and Unobservable Behaviour: Part I
- Renegotiating moral hazard contracts under limited liability and monotonicity
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