Implementation in an interdependent value framework

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.002zbMath1291.91086OpenAlexW2013134248MaRDI QIDQ2452816

Levent Ülkü

Publication date: 5 June 2014

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.002

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (1)

Ex-post implementation with interdependent values

Cites Work

• An optimal auction for complements
• Multiple unit auctions of an indivisible good
• Mechanism design without revenue equivalence
• Optimal combinatorial mechanism design
• The Limits of ex post Implementation
• Optimal Selling Strategies under Uncertainty for a Discriminating Monopolist when Demands are Interdependent
• Optimal Auction Design
• Efficient Auctions
• Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations
• Envelope Theorems for Arbitrary Choice Sets
• Information Acquisition and Efficient Mechanism Design
• An Efficient Auction

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