Rich language and refinements of cheap-talk equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.004zbMath1152.91374OpenAlexW2081930671MaRDI QIDQ2496231

Wojciech Olszewski

Publication date: 12 July 2006

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2004.12.004

zbMATH Keywords

equilibrium refinementscheap-talk games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28)

Related Items (1)

Equilibrium selection through forward induction in cheap talk games

Cites Work

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• Persistent equilibria in strategic games
• Communication between rational agents
• Refining cheap-talk equilibria
• An evolutionary analysis of backward and forward induction
• Meaning and credibility in cheap-talk games
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• Evolutionary stability in games of communication
• Equilibrium refinements in sender-receiver games
• Credible proposals in communication games
• Learning to communicate in cheap-talk games.
• Communication-proof equilibria in cheap-talk games
• Neighborhood stability in sender-receiver games
• Deviations, dynamics, and equilibrium refinements
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Strategic Information Transmission
• Real Analysis and Probability
• Evolutions of communication with partial common interest

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