Efficient and stable collective choices under gregarious preferences

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2007.12.007zbMath1152.91430OpenAlexW2113323799MaRDI QIDQ2519487

Jordi Massó, Antonio Nicolò

Publication date: 26 January 2009

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://ddd.uab.cat/record/143795

zbMATH Keywords

public goodssubgame perfect implementationgregarious preferences

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (3)

Manipulability in a group activity selection problem ⋮ Strategy-proof group selection under single-peaked preferences over group size ⋮ Strategy-proof club formation with indivisible club facilities

Cites Work

• Subgame perfect implementation: A necessary and almost sufficient condition
• Nash implementation without no-veto power
• Simple subscription mechanisms for excludable public goods
• Exact implementation
• The strategy-proof provision of public goods under congestion and crowding preferences
• Subgame perfect implementation: a full characterization
• Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms
• A crash course in implementation theory
• On exiting after voting
• Nash implementing non-monotonic social choice rules by awards
• Subgame Perfect Implementation
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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