An experimental study of voting rules and polls in three-candidate elections

DOI10.1007/BF02425262zbMath0864.90027MaRDI QIDQ2564158

Thomas A. Rietz, Roger B. Myerson, Robert J. Weber, Robert Forsythe

Publication date: 26 January 1997

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

plurality ruleBorda ruleapproval votinglaboratory settingresults of elections

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

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Cites Work

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• Properties of a measure of predictive success
• Elections with limited information: A fulfilled expectations model using contemporaneous poll and endorsement data as information sources
• An experiment on coordination in multi-candidate elections: The importance of polls and election histories
• Mathematical Derivation of an Election System

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