Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009zbMath1100.91004MaRDI QIDQ2571802

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 14 November 2005

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10131/3083

zbMATH Keywords

Robustness; Incomplete information; Potential; Refinements

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91A10: Noncooperative games

90C47: Minimax problems in mathematical programming

Related Items

Log-linear dynamics and local potential, Epsilon-equilibria of perturbed games, Evolutionary potential games on lattices, Approximate robustness of equilibrium to incomplete information, Potential games in volatile environments, Adaptive learning and \(p\)-best response sets, Noise-independent selection in global games and monotone potential maximizer: a symmetric \(3 \times 3\) example, On the relationship between robustness to incomplete information and noise-independent selection in global games, Strategic complementarities and nested potential games, Every symmetric \(3 \times 3\) global game of strategic complementarities has noise-independent selection, Payoff-dependent dynamics and coordination games, \(p\)-best response set, Contagion and uninvadability in local interaction games: the bilingual game and general supermodular games, Perfect foresight dynamics in games with linear incentives and time symmetry, Robust equilibria under non-common priors, Games with the total bandwagon property meet the Quint-Shubik conjecture, On the equivalence of robustness to canonical and general elaborations, Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities., The logit-response dynamics, Iterated potential and robustness of equilibria, Noise-independent selection in multidimensional global games, Dynamics in near-potential games, Saddle functions and robust sets of equilibria, Risk-dominance and perfect foresight dynamics in \(N\)-player games, \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Best response equivalence
• On stability of perfect equilibrium points
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Perfect foresight and equilibrium selection in symmetric potential games
• The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
• On the relationship between risk-dominance and stochastic stability
• A Shapley value representation of potential games
• Equilibrium selection in global games with strategic complementarities.
• Potential games
• \(p\)-dominance and equilibrium selection under perfect foresight dynamics.
• An approach to equilibrium selection
• Potential games: A purely ordinal approach
• Best-response potential games
• \(p\)-best response set and the robustness of equilibria to incomplete information
• A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
• Global Games and Equilibrium Selection
• A DIFFERENTIAL GAME APPROACH TO EVOLUTIONARY EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• The Robustness of Equilibria to Incomplete Information
• Robust Equilibria of Potential Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• p-Dominance and Belief Potential
• Basins of Attraction, Long-Run Stochastic Stability, and the Speed of Step-by-Step Evolution
• Me\fehler und Information
• Upper and Lower Probabilities Induced by a Multivalued Mapping