Constitutional Rules of Exclusion in Jurisdiction Formation

DOI10.1111/1467-937X.00174zbMath0980.91070OpenAlexW2120644568MaRDI QIDQ2747241

Philippe Jehiel, Suzanne Scotchmer

Publication date: 14 October 2001

Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-937x.00174

zbMATH Keywords

immigrationequilibriaconstitutional rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

History, political science (91F10)

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