Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_18zbMath1348.91094OpenAlexW3139676846MaRDI QIDQ2829691

Arnaud Dellis

Publication date: 8 November 2016

Published in: Studies in Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-02839-7_18

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) History, political science (91F10)

Related Items (3)

Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study ⋮ Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting ⋮ Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference

Cites Work

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• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• Approval voting with endogenous candidates
• Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation?
• Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games
• Strategic, sincere, and heuristic voting under four election rules: an experimental study
• Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment
• An Economic Model of Representative Democracy
• Strategic Candidacy and Voting Procedures
• Do Voters Affect or Elect Policies? Evidence from the U. S. House
• A Model of Political Competition with Citizen-Candidates

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