AGENT CONNECTEDNESS AND BACKWARD INDUCTION
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Publication:2883140
DOI10.1142/S0219198911002940zbMath1237.91038MaRDI QIDQ2883140
Conrad Heilmann, Christian W. Bach
Publication date: 11 May 2012
Published in: International Game Theory Review (Search for Journal in Brave)
Related Items
Behavior and deliberation in perfect-information games: Nash equilibrium and backward induction, Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games, Naiveté and sophistication in dynamic inconsistency
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