An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation

DOI10.3982/ECTA8852zbMath1274.91167WikidataQ59938109 ScholiaQ59938109MaRDI QIDQ3019441

Jacob K. Goeree, Leeat Yariv

Publication date: 28 July 2011

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingdeliberative votingjury decision-making

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (18)

Deliberative voting ⋮ Consistency and communication in committees ⋮ Collusion through communication in auctions ⋮ Lying for votes ⋮ Does allowing private communication lead to less prosocial collective choice? ⋮ Learning through period and physical time ⋮ Compulsory versus voluntary voting: an experimental study ⋮ Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups ⋮ The dark side of the vote: biased voters, social information, and information aggregation through majority voting ⋮ Dynamic legislative bargaining with veto power: theory and experiments ⋮ How cheap talk enhances efficiency in threshold public goods games ⋮ Unanimous rules in the laboratory ⋮ Voting with endogenous information acquisition: experimental evidence ⋮ Voter motivation and the quality of democratic choice ⋮ The swing voter's curse in social networks ⋮ Combining forecasts in the presence of ambiguity over correlation structures ⋮ Non-congruent views about signal precision in collective decisions ⋮ Jury voting without objective probability

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