Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics

DOI10.3982/TE771zbMath1279.91028OpenAlexW2153982278MaRDI QIDQ3095014

Josef Hofbauer, William H. Sandholm

Publication date: 28 October 2011

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/te771

zbMATH Keywords

nonconvergenceevolutionary game theoryevolutionary game dynamicsdominated strategies

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

Efficiency and competition in the long run: The survival of the unfit ⋮ Quantal response methods for equilibrium selection in normal form games ⋮ Ordinal imitative dynamics ⋮ Perturbations of set-valued dynamical systems, with applications to game theory ⋮ Sampling best response dynamics and deterministic equilibrium selection ⋮ Evolutionary robustness of dominant strategy implementation ⋮ Higher order game dynamics ⋮ Discrete dynamics in evolutionary games ⋮ Equilibrium selection under evolutionary game dynamics with optimizing behavior ⋮ Game dynamics and Nash equilibria ⋮ Evolutionary Game Theory ⋮ Stable games and their dynamics ⋮ Evolutionary selection against iteratively weakly dominated strategies ⋮ Imitation in heterogeneous populations ⋮ Stability for best experienced payoff dynamics ⋮ The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic ⋮ The target projection dynamic ⋮ Strictly dominated strategies in the replicator-mutator dynamics ⋮ Tributes to Bill Sandholm ⋮ Survival of dominated strategies under imitation dynamics ⋮ Large deviations and stochastic stability in population games ⋮ Evolutionary exploration of the finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma -- the effect of out-of-equilibrium play

This page was built for publication: Survival of dominated strategies under evolutionary dynamics