Some Remarks on Dodgson's Voting Rule

DOI10.1002/malq.200810017zbMath1355.91044OpenAlexW2141335710MaRDI QIDQ3392311

Felix Brandt

Publication date: 14 August 2009

Published in: Mathematical Logic Quarterly (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1002/malq.200810017

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryvoting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (4)

Properties of multiwinner voting rules ⋮ Distance rationalization of voting rules ⋮ On the approximability of Dodgson and Young elections ⋮ Socially desirable approximations for dodgson’s voting rule

Cites Work

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• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Covering sets and a new Condorcet choice correspondence
• Voting schemes for which it can be difficult to tell who won the election
• Monotonicity paradoxes in the theory of elections
• The Dodgson ranking and its relation to Kemeny's method and Slater's rule
• A comparison of some distance-based choice rules in ranking environments
• Aggregation of preferences with a variable set of alternatives
• Consequences of reversing preferences
• Exact analysis of Dodgson elections
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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