Consistency, Rationality and Collective Choice
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Publication:4135183
DOI10.2307/2297222zbMath0361.90003OpenAlexW2027566924MaRDI QIDQ4135183
Publication date: 1976
Published in: The Review of Economic Studies (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.2307/2297222
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