Rationing rules and stable coalition structures

DOI10.3982/TE2870zbMath1419.91040WikidataQ129050282 ScholiaQ129050282MaRDI QIDQ4612458

Oihane Gallo, Elena Inarra

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Theoretical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

coalition formationhedonic gamesrationing rulescore stability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Axiomatizations of coalition aggregation functions

Cites Work

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